I'm usually a big fan of Global Post, but a recent blog item caught my attention for its lack of insight. (Link in title of post).
The author asks whether the Monterrey attack is "Mexico’s final straw," and then goes on to say that "Mexicans have protested before, demanding an end to mass graves and kidnappings amid the drug violence. In the past, little has changed. This time, though, it seems like the people's anger may have helped bring about some results."
The results: the arrest of five suspects.
Anyone who has covered Mexico, or even observed it from a distance for some time, knows that suspects are often arrested after incidents like this, after mass protests, after public outcry, after political calls for justice. Anyone who knows Mexico also knows that due to lack of good investigations, god only knows whether the alleged culprits are indeed guilty.
I'll keep reading Global Post, but I would prefer if it didn't feed into the pro-Sicilia people power hype and instead kept a more level-headed sense of perspective on Mexico.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Monday, August 29, 2011
Just when you thought you knew something
Various media (including the Associated Press, link in title of post) have stories out about the Sinaloa cartel's apparent expansion into meth production. The reports – citing US law enforcement officials in Mexico (ie, DEA) – come on the heels of some massive meth busts. One was in Queretaro, where authorities seized nearly 500 tons of precursors (the chemicals used to make meth, which are banned in Mexico). Another seizure in Queretaro netted 3.4 tons of pure meth, worth about $100 million, according to the AP.
Mexican authorities also seized a 300-foot meth lab buried underground in Sinaloa. The authorities and the media have put two and two together, speculating that the Sinaloa cartel is increasing its interest in meth and trying to take over from the splintered La Familia as the major meth producer in Mexico.
There are several problems with this logic: While meth production in Mexico began in Michoacan (and Colima) under the Amezcua brothers in the 1980s, El Chapo Guzman and his Sinaloa crew moved into the business at least as early as 2003. They knew it was a golden opportunity.
Since then, massive meth labs have regularly been seized in Sinaloa, including one in 2009 which had the capacity to produce about 20 tons of meth – US street value, $700 million – in a month. Another meth compound in Durango was seized in the summer of the same year – it boasted top-of-the-range technology (internet, satellite tv, sat phones etc) and was nicknamed "El paraiso de cristal." Chapo was believed to have hidden out there, along with Nacho Coronel, who incidentally was nicknamed the "Ice King" because of his meth interests.
It should also be noted that La Familia has NEVER had the clout that the Sinaloa or Gulf cartel have had. When La Familia started rising up, it's believed that Chapo struck a deal with the Michoacan-based group – La Familia would produce the meth, the Sinaloa cartel would distribute it. After all, La Familia lacks a smuggling corridor into the United States, therefore must always rely on one of the bigger groups to allow it passage.
In the AP story, the US official is also quoted as saying the Sinaloa cartel has a better distribution network in the US than La Familia. This is absolutely right, as the Sinaloa cartel enjoys longer working relationships with US gang counterparts, probably has a better foothold of its own when it comes to distribution, while La Familia can only really rely on unestablished opportunists and fellow Michoacanos (hence a large suspected La Familia presence in Chicago, which is home to a very large community of Michoacan expats).
And yet: the DEA recently announced the results of Project Delirium, a 20-month series of US investigations targeting La Familia. 1,985 arrests were made, $62 million in U.S. currency was seized, as well as 2,773 pounds of methamphetamine, 2,722 kilograms of cocaine, 1,005 pounds of heroin, 14,818 pounds of marijuana and $3.8 million in other assets.
On Oct. 22, 2009, the DEA announced the results of Project Coronado, a 44-month series of investigations which resulted in the arrest of more than 1,186 alleged members of La Familia.
I have a few problems with these two operations: Heroin is not produced in large quantities in Michoacan. La Familia is from Michoacan. Are you telling me that La Familia, the cartel (as it's called by the DEA), is running heroin for another cartel? Sounds iffy to me. There have been cases of independent operators working in Michoacan, stockpiling poppy bought in Guerrero and then distributing it on up north, but to the best of my knowledge, these guys have not been members of La Familia, and my speculation (based on their last names and connections that have been made public) is that they were Sinaloans.
Second, Project Coronado was 44-months in the making. Forty-four months before Oct. 22, 2009, La Familia had yet to exist, or at least be known, outside of small towns in Michoacan. The group had yet to throw heads on a dance floor in Uruapan, for instance. I find it difficult to believe that the DEA had such great inside sources that they knew about La Familia's rise even before the Mexican authorities, who admitted quite bluntly in 2006 and even 2008 (the grenade attack in Morelia) that they really didn't have any idea of La Familia's growing clout.
Last point to a long-winded post: I believe we will see a global rise in meth production and distribution in the coming years, as the world works itself out of a recession. Meth is cheap to produce, cheap to sell, cheap to buy and as cheap a high as you're likely to find. Recession-proof, to say the least.
Mexican authorities also seized a 300-foot meth lab buried underground in Sinaloa. The authorities and the media have put two and two together, speculating that the Sinaloa cartel is increasing its interest in meth and trying to take over from the splintered La Familia as the major meth producer in Mexico.
There are several problems with this logic: While meth production in Mexico began in Michoacan (and Colima) under the Amezcua brothers in the 1980s, El Chapo Guzman and his Sinaloa crew moved into the business at least as early as 2003. They knew it was a golden opportunity.
Since then, massive meth labs have regularly been seized in Sinaloa, including one in 2009 which had the capacity to produce about 20 tons of meth – US street value, $700 million – in a month. Another meth compound in Durango was seized in the summer of the same year – it boasted top-of-the-range technology (internet, satellite tv, sat phones etc) and was nicknamed "El paraiso de cristal." Chapo was believed to have hidden out there, along with Nacho Coronel, who incidentally was nicknamed the "Ice King" because of his meth interests.
It should also be noted that La Familia has NEVER had the clout that the Sinaloa or Gulf cartel have had. When La Familia started rising up, it's believed that Chapo struck a deal with the Michoacan-based group – La Familia would produce the meth, the Sinaloa cartel would distribute it. After all, La Familia lacks a smuggling corridor into the United States, therefore must always rely on one of the bigger groups to allow it passage.
In the AP story, the US official is also quoted as saying the Sinaloa cartel has a better distribution network in the US than La Familia. This is absolutely right, as the Sinaloa cartel enjoys longer working relationships with US gang counterparts, probably has a better foothold of its own when it comes to distribution, while La Familia can only really rely on unestablished opportunists and fellow Michoacanos (hence a large suspected La Familia presence in Chicago, which is home to a very large community of Michoacan expats).
And yet: the DEA recently announced the results of Project Delirium, a 20-month series of US investigations targeting La Familia. 1,985 arrests were made, $62 million in U.S. currency was seized, as well as 2,773 pounds of methamphetamine, 2,722 kilograms of cocaine, 1,005 pounds of heroin, 14,818 pounds of marijuana and $3.8 million in other assets.
On Oct. 22, 2009, the DEA announced the results of Project Coronado, a 44-month series of investigations which resulted in the arrest of more than 1,186 alleged members of La Familia.
I have a few problems with these two operations: Heroin is not produced in large quantities in Michoacan. La Familia is from Michoacan. Are you telling me that La Familia, the cartel (as it's called by the DEA), is running heroin for another cartel? Sounds iffy to me. There have been cases of independent operators working in Michoacan, stockpiling poppy bought in Guerrero and then distributing it on up north, but to the best of my knowledge, these guys have not been members of La Familia, and my speculation (based on their last names and connections that have been made public) is that they were Sinaloans.
Second, Project Coronado was 44-months in the making. Forty-four months before Oct. 22, 2009, La Familia had yet to exist, or at least be known, outside of small towns in Michoacan. The group had yet to throw heads on a dance floor in Uruapan, for instance. I find it difficult to believe that the DEA had such great inside sources that they knew about La Familia's rise even before the Mexican authorities, who admitted quite bluntly in 2006 and even 2008 (the grenade attack in Morelia) that they really didn't have any idea of La Familia's growing clout.
Last point to a long-winded post: I believe we will see a global rise in meth production and distribution in the coming years, as the world works itself out of a recession. Meth is cheap to produce, cheap to sell, cheap to buy and as cheap a high as you're likely to find. Recession-proof, to say the least.
Saturday, August 27, 2011
My thoughts on Monterrey
Just wrote a piece for Foreign Policy about Mexico's latest atrocity, the torching of a casino in Monterrey that left at least 52 dead. Link is in title of the post.
Monday, August 22, 2011
Meeting Saviano
The call came in the evening. He will see you, Mr. Malcolm. His security team has cleared your visit. You will meet with him in the late morning.
We drove through the hills, the lush vegetation surrounding us on all sides. A few miles outside of the city, and we were the only people on the road. We continued on for about 15 minutes.
We turned into the driveway of a villa. It's a hotel now, but it was once owned by a wealthy family from Perugia.
The bodyguards met us at the door.
"He's waiting in his quarters. He's ready to see you," one of them said.
I walked across the gardens, past the swimming pool, to a room – most likely, it was normally used as a conference room by visitors on business.
Today, it was empty. Empty, save a table in the middle, with three chairs.
I sat down. I was sweating. I often sweat ahead of meetings like this, but usually it's from the heat. This time, it was from nerves. I was about to meet a man I had heard much about. A man who I respected. A man who has a price on his head, and who has been on the run, living in hiding, since 2008.
He walked in. He had a big grin on his face, a childlike grin. He was happy to see me. I was delighted to see him, to meet him in person, finally.
We talked. He talked about the mafia in Italy; I told him about the mafias in Mexico. We talked about the history of mafias, their rise in the United States. We talked about what we would really like to write about as journalists, if we had a real choice in the matter. We exchanged pleasantries, polite comments about each other's books, about projects we might undertake in the future. He told me about his life in hiding. I told him that our meeting was a bit odd; I felt like I was meeting a mafia boss, whereas in fact I was meeting just another journalist.
We both admitted we don't like fame in our profession; journalists are not supposed to be famous, we both agreed. At least I can wander around wherever I want, I told him. Yes, he said; I have to deal with my security everywhere. I can't do anything normal anymore.
"I just want to buy a girl an ice cream," he said, softly.
After about 30 minutes, my meeting with Roberto Saviano came to an end. He got into a black car, surrounded by bodyguards provided by the Italian government since his ground-breaking book Gomorra, an expose of the Neapolitan mafia best known as the Camorra. I waved goodbye as he drove off to a new hiding place, somewhere in Italy, somewhere out of the line of fire of the men he exposed, the men who issued death threats after his book put the spotlight on their illicit activities and influence.
His car drove off, up the hill and out of sight.
We drove through the hills, the lush vegetation surrounding us on all sides. A few miles outside of the city, and we were the only people on the road. We continued on for about 15 minutes.
We turned into the driveway of a villa. It's a hotel now, but it was once owned by a wealthy family from Perugia.
The bodyguards met us at the door.
"He's waiting in his quarters. He's ready to see you," one of them said.
I walked across the gardens, past the swimming pool, to a room – most likely, it was normally used as a conference room by visitors on business.
Today, it was empty. Empty, save a table in the middle, with three chairs.
I sat down. I was sweating. I often sweat ahead of meetings like this, but usually it's from the heat. This time, it was from nerves. I was about to meet a man I had heard much about. A man who I respected. A man who has a price on his head, and who has been on the run, living in hiding, since 2008.
He walked in. He had a big grin on his face, a childlike grin. He was happy to see me. I was delighted to see him, to meet him in person, finally.
We talked. He talked about the mafia in Italy; I told him about the mafias in Mexico. We talked about the history of mafias, their rise in the United States. We talked about what we would really like to write about as journalists, if we had a real choice in the matter. We exchanged pleasantries, polite comments about each other's books, about projects we might undertake in the future. He told me about his life in hiding. I told him that our meeting was a bit odd; I felt like I was meeting a mafia boss, whereas in fact I was meeting just another journalist.
We both admitted we don't like fame in our profession; journalists are not supposed to be famous, we both agreed. At least I can wander around wherever I want, I told him. Yes, he said; I have to deal with my security everywhere. I can't do anything normal anymore.
"I just want to buy a girl an ice cream," he said, softly.
After about 30 minutes, my meeting with Roberto Saviano came to an end. He got into a black car, surrounded by bodyguards provided by the Italian government since his ground-breaking book Gomorra, an expose of the Neapolitan mafia best known as the Camorra. I waved goodbye as he drove off to a new hiding place, somewhere in Italy, somewhere out of the line of fire of the men he exposed, the men who issued death threats after his book put the spotlight on their illicit activities and influence.
His car drove off, up the hill and out of sight.
Saturday, August 13, 2011
Chapo has been caught...
Chapo's been caught talking on the new iphone4 (http://www.apple.com/iphone/) in the hills of Sinaloa. He was apparently talking to Lindsay Lohan (http://www.tmz.com/person/lindsay-lohan/) about the new Harry Potter flick (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1201607/)
Joking, obviously, but trying to see if this will pick up hits for my blog, then maybe I'll start blogging again regularly.
Joking, obviously, but trying to see if this will pick up hits for my blog, then maybe I'll start blogging again regularly.
Thursday, July 14, 2011
Mexico's image problem
Foreign Policy magazine has just published my piece on Mexico's image issues; check it out. (Link is in the title of the post.)
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
How powerful is Chapo?
Interpol's chief representative in Mexico says that Joaquin "Chapo" Guzman Loera is losing clout, and no longer has such great control over drug trafficking out of Mexico. Patrick Corcoran has a good short summary at InSight (link in title of post.)
Wait, but wasn't Chapo the most powerful drug trafficker in the world just a few weeks ago, according to one DEA official? (I allude to it too in the title of my book, "The Last Narco, inside the hunt for the world's most wanted drug lord")
Here's the thing about the drug trade: it evolves rapidly. Chapo doesn't man the day-to-day operations of the Sinaloa cartel anymore (and actually, rarely did in the past, operating more like a hands-off CEO), but every time a new group springs up that might threaten his hegemony, he makes a move – an alliance or war. When La Familia sprang up in the early part of last decade, for instance, he let them operate and made deals with them so that their meth could be moved across the US border (being based in Michoacan, La Familia had a coastline but no direct overland route to the US). When he saw an opportunity in Nuevo Laredo – a weakened Gulf cartel – Chapo sent his people there to try and take that plaza in 2003. (They failed.) When La Familia started becoming more influential and powerful in 2006-2007, Chapo made a more formal alliance with them, effectively incorporating the smaller group into his organization.
When the violence produced by Los Zetas and other thugs in Tamaulipas got out of hand, Chapo and the Gulf cartel struck an alliance to crack down on them, with the greater good (well, from their perspective, which is drug trafficking) in mind.
With all these alliances, Chapo's control has expanded, but these are not cut-and-dry deals – the alliances shift, and he only purportedly steps in when absolutely necessary. So one could interpret the growing activity of other gangs as a sign that Chapo does not have as much control, but the reality is that in many cases, they operate with his blessing – so he's basically still in charge. However, there are clear signs – massacres and shootouts in Durango, for instance – that suggest he is not in control of these other gangs. Conflicts in Sinaloa, too, suggest he doesn't even have complete control of operations in his home state.
Chapo's operations are also certainly growing worldwide – Sinaloan drug traffickers have been arrested in a number of countries, ranging from Egypt to Argentina to Malaysia in recent years. Whether they are actual Sinaloa cartel operatives – ie, in the employ of Chapo himself – or lowly drug traffickers who happen to come from Sinaloa and are trying to make some money, is unclear. Some have been confirmed as actual operatives and conejos (scouts), others have not. Properties belonging to Chapo and his Sinaloa cartel cronies have also been seized in Europe and parts of South America, which points to an obvious expansion of presence, even if cartel operatives in this case are lawyers and money launderers.
As we've seen Chapo's operations grow globally, we've also seen the decline of his hegemony at home. This is unsurprising, in my opinion, because as he extends his empire, he's going to risk losing control of his base operations. If you're fighting a war on various fronts, expanding your business by acquiring new groups and at the same time facing pressure from the authorities (yes, contrary to popular belief, the Sinaloa cartel has been hit very hard by the Mexican authorities, lots of arrests and seizures, etc), you leave yourself vulnerable at home. You are putting resources and effort into foreign operations, while your base is being attacked. Recent conflicts in Sinaloa indicate that there is very little top-down control being implemented by Chapo and El Mayo in the region – their focus is obviously elsewhere.
The real question is what this will mean for the drug war going forward: will Chapo lose control altogether? He never has before, and has been in precarious situations in the past. But he's 54 years old now, and has been on the run for 11 years. And the situation is quite different today: the Zetas and La Familia are not tight-knit, organized units with which alliances can be easily struck. Both organizations are heavily divided, fractured even, and not easily controlled. They seem content to massacre migrants and shoot up innocents, no matter how bad it might be for business. And no one seems to be sending them a message to quiet down anymore, which Chapo and El Mayo used to do in Sinaloa.
I do envision Chapo losing control. I don't see the possibility of a pact, nor do I see him taking control back once he's lost it. I see the increased efforts to launder money and buy property outside of Mexico as a means of getting out while he still can. And the inability (or reluctance) to stem violence in Sinaloa and Durango on the part of Chapo and his crew appears to be a further sign of his diminishing power. That said, I think the Sinaloa cartel will continue to grow globally, and probably domestically, as a loose-knit federation (which is always how it operated in Sinaloa and its environs).
As for the violence, it's tragic, but I think Police Chief Genaro Garcia Luna is right in his assessment – it's not going to ease up for another 7 years or so. More groups operating independently will inevitably mean more disputes being settled through violence rather than dialogue (say what you will about the old guard, but they did have meetings and strike alliances that way); I also think the degree of brutality will increase, although that is indeed hard to imagine, because these groups will have to outdo each other to gain respect.
Oh, and for what it's worth, I still think Chapo will be killed before the 2012 elections. Again, it's just a hunch, I don't have any intel that would back this up.
Wait, but wasn't Chapo the most powerful drug trafficker in the world just a few weeks ago, according to one DEA official? (I allude to it too in the title of my book, "The Last Narco, inside the hunt for the world's most wanted drug lord")
Here's the thing about the drug trade: it evolves rapidly. Chapo doesn't man the day-to-day operations of the Sinaloa cartel anymore (and actually, rarely did in the past, operating more like a hands-off CEO), but every time a new group springs up that might threaten his hegemony, he makes a move – an alliance or war. When La Familia sprang up in the early part of last decade, for instance, he let them operate and made deals with them so that their meth could be moved across the US border (being based in Michoacan, La Familia had a coastline but no direct overland route to the US). When he saw an opportunity in Nuevo Laredo – a weakened Gulf cartel – Chapo sent his people there to try and take that plaza in 2003. (They failed.) When La Familia started becoming more influential and powerful in 2006-2007, Chapo made a more formal alliance with them, effectively incorporating the smaller group into his organization.
When the violence produced by Los Zetas and other thugs in Tamaulipas got out of hand, Chapo and the Gulf cartel struck an alliance to crack down on them, with the greater good (well, from their perspective, which is drug trafficking) in mind.
With all these alliances, Chapo's control has expanded, but these are not cut-and-dry deals – the alliances shift, and he only purportedly steps in when absolutely necessary. So one could interpret the growing activity of other gangs as a sign that Chapo does not have as much control, but the reality is that in many cases, they operate with his blessing – so he's basically still in charge. However, there are clear signs – massacres and shootouts in Durango, for instance – that suggest he is not in control of these other gangs. Conflicts in Sinaloa, too, suggest he doesn't even have complete control of operations in his home state.
Chapo's operations are also certainly growing worldwide – Sinaloan drug traffickers have been arrested in a number of countries, ranging from Egypt to Argentina to Malaysia in recent years. Whether they are actual Sinaloa cartel operatives – ie, in the employ of Chapo himself – or lowly drug traffickers who happen to come from Sinaloa and are trying to make some money, is unclear. Some have been confirmed as actual operatives and conejos (scouts), others have not. Properties belonging to Chapo and his Sinaloa cartel cronies have also been seized in Europe and parts of South America, which points to an obvious expansion of presence, even if cartel operatives in this case are lawyers and money launderers.
As we've seen Chapo's operations grow globally, we've also seen the decline of his hegemony at home. This is unsurprising, in my opinion, because as he extends his empire, he's going to risk losing control of his base operations. If you're fighting a war on various fronts, expanding your business by acquiring new groups and at the same time facing pressure from the authorities (yes, contrary to popular belief, the Sinaloa cartel has been hit very hard by the Mexican authorities, lots of arrests and seizures, etc), you leave yourself vulnerable at home. You are putting resources and effort into foreign operations, while your base is being attacked. Recent conflicts in Sinaloa indicate that there is very little top-down control being implemented by Chapo and El Mayo in the region – their focus is obviously elsewhere.
The real question is what this will mean for the drug war going forward: will Chapo lose control altogether? He never has before, and has been in precarious situations in the past. But he's 54 years old now, and has been on the run for 11 years. And the situation is quite different today: the Zetas and La Familia are not tight-knit, organized units with which alliances can be easily struck. Both organizations are heavily divided, fractured even, and not easily controlled. They seem content to massacre migrants and shoot up innocents, no matter how bad it might be for business. And no one seems to be sending them a message to quiet down anymore, which Chapo and El Mayo used to do in Sinaloa.
I do envision Chapo losing control. I don't see the possibility of a pact, nor do I see him taking control back once he's lost it. I see the increased efforts to launder money and buy property outside of Mexico as a means of getting out while he still can. And the inability (or reluctance) to stem violence in Sinaloa and Durango on the part of Chapo and his crew appears to be a further sign of his diminishing power. That said, I think the Sinaloa cartel will continue to grow globally, and probably domestically, as a loose-knit federation (which is always how it operated in Sinaloa and its environs).
As for the violence, it's tragic, but I think Police Chief Genaro Garcia Luna is right in his assessment – it's not going to ease up for another 7 years or so. More groups operating independently will inevitably mean more disputes being settled through violence rather than dialogue (say what you will about the old guard, but they did have meetings and strike alliances that way); I also think the degree of brutality will increase, although that is indeed hard to imagine, because these groups will have to outdo each other to gain respect.
Oh, and for what it's worth, I still think Chapo will be killed before the 2012 elections. Again, it's just a hunch, I don't have any intel that would back this up.
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